To analyze the eect of asset inequality on cooperation within a group, we consider a two-player noncooperative model of conservation of a commonpool resource. Overexploitation by one user aects another's payo by reducing the next-period catch. We give necessary and sucient conditions such that conservation is a Nash equilibrium, and show that increasing inequality does not, in general, favor full conservation. However, once inequality is suciently great, further inequality can raise eciency. Thus the relationship between inequality and economic eciency is U-shaped. Finally, we analyze the implications for conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons.
1. Introduction 1.1.
The commons dilemma and inequality. The daily livelihood of vast masses of the rural poor in many countries depends on the success with which common pool resources (CPRs) | such as forest resources, grazing lands, in-shore sheries, and irrigation water | are managed, and on the environmental consequences of their management. A CPR is dened by Ostrom (1990, p. 30) as \a natural or man-made resource system that is suciently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneciaries from obtaining benets from its use." Understanding the factors that lead to success or failure of community management of these resources is critical to rural development.
CPR management is a collective-action dilemma: a situation in which mutual cooperation is collectively rational for the group as a whole, but individual cooperation is not necessarily individually rational for each member. One factor that has not always been recognized as critical to the outcome of collective action dilemmas is heterogeneity among the resource users. Ostrom (1990) , whose analysis of local management of CPRs is probably the best-known, discusses homogeneity and heterogeneity, but excludes the issue from her list of factors crucial to successful CPR management. In this paper, our attention will be largely restricted to a single but potent kind of heterogeneity: inequality in asset ownership. Olson (1965, p. 34) hypothesized that inequality might f a v or the provision of a public good:
In smaller groups marked by considerable degrees of inequality | that is, in groups of members of unequal \size" or extent o f i n terest in the collective g o o d | there is the greatest likelihood that a collective good will be provided; for the greater the interest in the collective good of any single member, the greater the likelihood that that member will get such a signicant proportion of the total benet from the collective good that he will gain from seeing that the good is provided, even if he has to pay all of the cost himself. Inequality in this context can thus facilitate the provision of the collective good, with the small players free-riding on the contribution of the large player. In a very general setting, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) show that wealth redistributions that increase the wealth of equilibrium contributors to a public good will increase the supply of the public good. 3 These analyses of the supply of public goods are relevant to conservation among CPR users; restraint in resource use is analytically equivalent to contributing to a public good. Following these studies, we would expect group heterogeneity to be conducive to the eective local management of CPRs.
Nevertheless, eld studies of CPR management have repeatedly shown that inequality is harmful for collective action. Bardhan (1995) reviews the case-study literature regarding the relationship between inequality and cooperation in locally-managed irrigation systems, primarily in Asia. Baland and Platteau (1996 , 1998 ) likewise summarize many relevant examples from the case-study literature; they focus more on forests, sheries and grazing lands, and on African cases. Johnson and Libecap's (1982) study of the Texas shrimp shery is a well-known example. The shery is exploited by a large eet of shers dierentiated by ability. The problem is one of overshing: in this case of increased eort and declining per-boat yields, there exists a collective incentive to self-regulate eort, in the form of production quotas, and thereby increase collective rents. The success of such contracting, however, is conditioned by the existence of high transaction costs. Johnson and Libecap assume that side-payments are impossible to administer, and that the information costs (and presumably enforcement costs) underlying agent-specic quotas are too high to make such a quota system practical; the only option, therefore, is a system of uniform quotas. The per-agent gain in moving from the unregulated equilibrium to the rent-maximizing output level (under uniform quotas) is the same for all agents, but the per-agent loss is increasing in agents' productivity. Thus it is possible that more productive shers stand to lose under a cooperative regime, and hence they will oppose it.
A small number of papers has sought to formalize the logic of the Johnson and Libecap example. Kanbur (1991) describes a two-person, simultaneous-move, numerical example in which the players have dierent p a y o functions. As payo inequality is increased, the ecient outcome ceases to be a self-enforcing equilibrium. Baland and Platteau (1997) argue that inequality in resource-use entitlements is associated with higher conservation in some examples where the resource-use technology (e.g., shing, harvesting, gathering) exhibits decreasing returns to eort. Under alternative cases featuring increasing returns to eort, the eect of increasing inequality is indeterminate.
This paper presents a model of heterogeneous resource users in a local commons dilemma. The model is couched in terms of a shery; thus the players are referred to as shers and the resource as the sh stock. Indeed, the crisis of conservation of sheries globally (see, e.g., Sana 1995) is at least as advanced as resource degradation in other CPRs. In particular, sheries are important to peasant economies throughout the developing world. Nevertheless, we chose the shery example primarily to lend concreteness to the discussion. We hope that the basic conclusions of the model will be transferable to other CPR examples, such as groundwater-based irrigation, community grazing lands, and village forests. It should further be noted that the externality between shers in our model diers from the usual congestion externality posited in research on the commons. In our model, one sher's overexploitation aects another's incentives through payos in the following period, while the conventional congestion externality acts through increased harvesting costs during this period. In Section 4.1, nevertheless, we consider a congestion externality i n a v ariant of our basic model.
Additionally, many researchers have argued that the commons dilemma is analogous to other social problems. Keohane and Ostrom (1994) point out that many issues in international relations bear a striking formal resemblance to CPRs: in both cases, agents have little recourse to external authority to impose ecient solutions. Others have argued that the problem of economic growth in the presence of poor property-rights protection is like a commons problem in which agents must \conserve" by forgoing current consumption of the commonly-held capital stock, or by diverting resources to the creation of institutions that protect property rights (Benhabib and Rustichini 1996; Tornell and Velasco 1992) . In a similar vein, a 1999 report of the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Social Aairs, Science and Technology identies \social cohesion" as the \ultimate common property resource. We can all benet from it if it exists, but it is far too easy to let the social fabric deteriorate as we each pursue our own short-term self-interest" (Government of Canada, 1999). In cross-country regression analysis for 29 market economies, Knack and Keefer (1997) nd that social cohesion (as measured by the level of trust and the propensity o f people to join voluntary organizations) is strongly associated with higher per capita income growth; furthermore they nd that the level of social cohesion is strongly and negatively associated with income inequality. If indeed social cohesion is a common-pool resource, then our research provides theoretical support for the negative eect of inequality detected by Knack and Keefer, although our results predict that this relationship is not strictly monotonic.
1.2.
Outline of the paper.
In the paper, we demonstrate that Olson's (1965) hypothesis | interpreted as a comparative-static statement that increasing inequality enhances eciency | is not always valid. In many settings increased inequality leads to less eciency; this is true whether or not shers have earning opportunities outside the commons. If these exit options are concave functions of wealth, increased inequality does not, in general, enhance the prospects for full conservation. Neither is it true that perfect equality always favors greater eciency. At a certain wealth distribution, increasing wealth inequality increases equilibrium eciency (though not attaining full conservation as long as both shers have positive wealth), and furthermore, full conservation is an equilibrium under perfect inequality. In the model where shers have exit options, full conservation cannot be an equilibrium under perfect equality i f a v erage wealth is below some threshold level. (In a one-period variant of our model with myopic players and a congestion externality, we show that increasing inequality of asset ownership reduces aggregate catch.)
The related assertion that the larger player has a greater interest in collective action than the smaller is borne out in many settings: with or without concave exit options, it is the poor who do not conserve. This too is dependent on the assumptions made: if exit-option functions are convex, for example, it is the poorer sher who has an interest in conditional conservation, while the richer sher prefers the exit strategy. That the larger player, in many settings, has a greater interest in collective action than the smaller does not imply, h o w e v er, that a more unequal distribution of wealth will lead to more successful collective action.
A signicant result is that the relationship between inequality and collective action is not necessarily monotonic. In fact, the relationship is U-shaped: at very low and very high levels of inequality, conservation is possible, while for some middle range of inequality i t i s not.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 sketches a basic noncooperative commons game. We extend the basic game in Section 3 to consider the eects on conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons. The two-player model we use in this chapter contributes to the tractability of the analysis and the transparency of the results. A two-player model abstracts from the group-size problem highlighted by Olson (1965) in order to better focus on the problem of inequality. In Section 4.2, the results of the basic model are extended to the many-sher case. Section 4.1 generalizes the catch technology and cost function of the basic model. Section 5 briey considers schemes for community regulation of the commons in light of the noncooperative model, and concludes.
2.
A simple model of the commons There are two shers, i = 1 ; 2. Each is endowed with wealth e i in each period. They share access to a common resource, namely a stock of sh F. In each of two periods t, each sher must choose to spend some portion of his endowment on shing capacity a t i ; t h u s a t i e i .
(a is short for \action.") Each sher's utility is simply the total amount of sh he catches:
U i = 1 i (a 1 i ) + 2 i (a 1 i ) where t i (1) is the amount of sh caught by sher i in period t. Fishing yield is a function f of capacity deployed: f(a t i ) = a t i unless total capacity deployed exceeds the available sh, in which case each sher gets a share of the total equal to his share of total wealth. (This is the situation known as \overcapitalization" in the literature on sheries.) Each sher's payo in period 1, then, is given by F; a 1 1 + a 1 2 > F Between periods the stock of sh grows at rate g, so that in period 2 the supply of sh is G 1 (F 0 1 1 0 1 2 ) , where G 1 + g. In the second period, each sher again chooses a capacity level a 2 i . The nature of each sher's endowment is such that any proportion of it can be used in each period for shing. It is not spent. It reects shing \eort", including number of boats and hours and intensity of labor. Note that in any ecient outcome there will be no shing in period 1. We make the following \commons dilemma assumption": E GF (1) where E e 1 + e 2 . Assumption (1) ensures that the threat of resource degradation is suciently acute. Alternatively, (1) can be interpreted as a \feasibility" condition: the shers are capable of harvesting the entire stock if they desire.
In the subgame consisting of the second period, both shers will always sh to capacity. That is, each will choose a 2 i = e i and receive second-period payo
Thus we can concentrate on the shers' actions in the rst period. A strategy is just a capacity choice a 1 i , and the rst-best outcome is a 1 1 = a 1 2 = 0 . A n y Nash equilibrium of the abbreviated rst-period game will be a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-period game, assuming full depletion occurs in the second period. For simplicity, we will hereafter suppress the period superscript, since all strategic choices under consideration are made in period 1. (If G were less than 1, there would be no real dilemma: rst-period depletion of the resource would be an equilibrium and an optimum.) The crowding externality that is sometimes a feature of commons models does not occur in our model within periods. That is, j's action in period 1 does not enter i's payo in that period, although j's period-1 action will enter i's period-2 payo, and vice-versa. (In Section 4.1 below, we consider a within-period congestion externality in the context of our model.)
The goal of conservation in sheries is to reduce shing to some level so that the remaining stock at the end of every period is sucient to guarantee the survival of the sh population. In our simple model, that level has been normalized to zero in the rst period. The second period extends to the end of the shers' relevant economic horizons. The two-period set-up precludes consideration of complicated punishment strategies, but it is sucient to capture the fundamental dilemma of resource conservation: namely, when is it reasonable to forgo current-period consumption in return for higher next-period gains? 4 In this model, we have abstracted from the problem of discount rates in order to focus more clearly on the incentives toward resource conservation. Formally, the discount rate would be subtracted from G, the rate of sh-stock regeneration. If the discount rate is greater than G, rst-period depletion of the shery is optimal, and conservation is not economically rational. Furthermore, each sher's discount rate is plausibly a decreasing function of wealth. In this case, the more unequal the distribution of endowments, the more dicult it will be to sustain universal conservation of the resource. It is as if the poor sher faces a low rate of growth in the stock and hence has little incentive to conserve.
The following proposition notes the conditions under which the least ecient outcome is a Nash equilibrium. (The proof of this and all other propositions is provided in the Appendix.) In particular, note that Proposition 1 implies that if e i > F for i = 1 ; 2 | if each sher could unilaterally harvest the entire sh stock in the rst period | then complete resource depletion is an equilibrium. When is full conservation a Nash equilibrium? Proposition 2 gives necessary and sucient conditions. Proposition 2. In the basic game described above, when both players have positive wealth, a 1 = a 2 = 0 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if e i E=Gfor i = 1 ; 2.
The conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 can be satised simultaneously. In fact, whenever the condition of Proposition 2 is satised (i.e., e i E=G; 8i), there are multiple equilibria, since the condition of Proposition 1 (i.e., e i F(G 0 1)=G; 8i) will also be satised under the commons dilemma assumption (1). This is illustrated in Figure 1 . 5 The 45 line shows all possible distributions of wealth e 1 + e 2 = E. Both full conservation (Proposition 2) and sh population varies (Levhari and Mirman 1980; Dutta and Sundaram 1993) . This can be approximated in our model by simply varying F as a comparative-static exercise. 5 This gure was suggested by Timothy Besley.
full depletion (Proposition 1) are equilibria for the range of wealth distributions BC. A t a point such a s A, full conservation is not an equilibrium; after an equalizing redistribution of wealth to a point between B and C, full conservation would be an equilibrium.
[ Figure 1 here]
Intuitively, E=Gis the threshold amount of wealth above which the sher will conserve, conditional on his counterpart's conservation. Alternatively, the condition e i E=G; 8i can be interpreted as dening a minimal regeneration rate G such that mutual conservation is possible in equilibrium. For the two-sher case we are considering here, this condition is equivalent t o G 2. This means that the sh stock must grow at a rate of 100%. This might seem worrisomely high; the astute reader will have moreover noticed that the n-player version of Proposition 2 will imply that conservation requires G n. This result is quite robust. For any general shing technology f(a i ) and sharing rule (f i g i2I ; P i = 1 g) in the case of overcapitalization, it can be shown that the appropriate generalization of Proposition 2 implies that G n, where n is the number of players in the set I. This is not necessarily the case if the share i accruing to sher i is a function of rst-period conservation, as it might be in the case of a regulated shery. W e will return to this point in Section 5.
This proposition suggests the following corollary. Dene 1(E) f (e 1 ; e 2 )je 1 0; e 2 0; e 1 + e 2 = Eg as the set of all distributions of E. For any e = ( e 1 ; e 2 ) 2 1(E),ê 2 1(E) i s a meanpreserving spread of e if jê 1 0ê 2 j > je 1 0 e 2 j. The Olson hypothesis that inequality enhances the prospects for collective action can be interpreted as a comparative-static statement: namely, that increasing inequality (for a given level of aggregate wealth) makes full conservation more likely. Corollary 1 suggests that this is not so. Part (b) states that, starting from any wealth distribution, there exists a less equal wealth distribution such that full conservation is not an equilibrium. In particular, if full conservation is an equilibrium under the initial distribution, then we know from Proposition 2 that e i E=Gfor i = 1 ; 2. Then wealth can be taken from one sher until e i < E = G for that sher; full conservation is no longer an equilibrium. In terms of Figure 1 , this is equivalent to moving from a point in the region BC to a point such a s A.
Corollary 1 illustrates that increased inequality does not necessarily lead to equilibrium conservation. Proposition 3, however, shows that under maximum inequality | that is, when one sher owns all the wealth | conservation is an equilibrium outcome. Proposition 3. In the basic game, if G is greater than or equal to one, then under perfect inequality ( e = ( E;0) or e = ( 0 ; E )), full conservation is a Nash equilibrium.
In part, Proposition 3 reects Olson's hypothesis that cooperation is more dicult in a group the larger the number of group members. In our shery, conservation is an equilibrium outcome when the number of shers with positive wealth is reduced to one.
The propositions above consider only the conditions under which full conservation by both shers is an equilibrium outcome. The more realistic case in an unregulated shery, and one perhaps closer to Olson's thinking, is one in which changes in the distribution of wealth change the level of eciency among a set of inecient equilibria. This is considered in the following proposition, which says that if the distribution of wealth is suciently unequal already, then making even more unequal can increase eciency. Dene M(e) a s the minimum among of rst-period shing among all Nash equilibria of the game when the distribution of endowments is e. and all mean-preserving spreads ofê, sher 1 will conserve regardless of the other's behavior. 6 The proposition also illustrates that the full-conservation equilibrium under perfect inequality in Proposition 3 is a limiting case as inequality is increased. For distributions such a ŝ e, one sher captures a suciently large share of the returns to conservation that he will unilaterally conserve. In particular, there exists an equilibrium in which the larger sher conserves, the smaller sher does not, and any mean-preserving spread increases eciency. If it were true that i's endowment were greater than E=G, then by Proposition 2, sher i would always conserve if sher j did. But since E > (G 0 1)F (which is guaranteed by condition (1)), then e i < E = G , and full-capacity period-1 shing is a best reply by sher i to full conservation by sher j. Thus any mean-preserving spreads ofê, b y further reducing i's capacity, will increase eciency, since sher j will play 0 and more shing will be deferred until the second period. Thus Olson (1965, p. 35 ) writes:
This suboptimality or ineciency will be somewhat less serious in groups composed of members of greatly dierent size or interest in the collective good. In such unequal groups, on the other hand, there is a tendency toward an arbitrary sharing of the burden of protecting the collective g o o d : : : [T] here is accordingly a surprising tendency for the \exploitation" of the great by the small .
This, then, is the commons analogue of the Olson public-goods hypothesis.
[ Figure 2 here]
This situation is summarized in Figure 2 , which shows (assuming that G 2) that as sher i's wealth share increases from 1 2 , full eciency is maintained until his share reaches (G 0 1)=G, at which point the other sher defects, reducing total catch. Then as the share of i continues to increase, the eciency of the system increases apace, since the other sher is capable of harvesting a decreasing fraction of the sh stock in period 1. When i owns all the wealth, full eciency is restored. 7 6 If we restrict the parameters so that E = F G , for G = 2, the wealth distributionê is given by 0 3 4 E; 1 4 E 1 . As G is increased beyond 2,ê becomes more unequal. 7 This gure was suggested by Jean-Marie Baland.
Exit options
In sheries worldwide, large shing companies with more opportunities to move their eets elsewhere (compared to small-scale local shers) are much less concerned about conservation of the resources in a given harvesting ground. This has been noted in the case of the Texas shrimp shery by Johnson and Libecap (1982) : there, larger shers have defected from quota schemes. Baland and Platteau (1997) cite a similar phenomenon in a Japanese shery, where industrial seiners are more apt to deplete sh stocks than local artisanal hook-and-line shers.
The phenomenon extends to other CPRs. In Mali and Mauritania, large (usually absentee) livestock herd owners have been much less interested than small herders in local arrangements for rangeland management to prevent o v ergrazing and desertication (Shanmugaranam et al. 1992 , cited in Baland and Platteau, 1996) . Freudenberger (1991) describes the deforestation of a forest ecosystem in Senegal by the local unit of a nationwide agricultural entity known as the Mouride. A relatively low-intensity pattern of resource use by nearby peasant producers and pastoralists gave w a y t o i n tensive cash-crop (groundnut) production. After the soil's rapid exhaustion by groundnut farming, the Mouride's national decision-making body could open up new territory elsewhere, unlike traditional users who were more interested in the long-term viability of the local forest. 8 In all the cases cited above, the richer or larger commons users were prone to defect. This need not always be the case. Other authors have reported that the poorer or smaller users exercise exit options. Bergeret and Ribot (1990) , in a study similar to that of Freudenberger, describe deforestation in a larger area and over a longer time frame, also in the Senegalese Sahel. Trees are harvested by F ulani refugees from Guinea, who are more likely to be landless than other peasants, in order to produce charcoal for the rapidly growing urban market. A qualitatively similar situation has been described in southern Burkina Faso, where immigrants are more prone to use destructive gathering techniques in communal forests (Laurent et al. 1994 , cited in Baland and Platteau 1997).
Let us then augment the basic game presented above so that each sher has an option to exit rather than sh in the second period. If only one sher exits in the second period, the other receives the entire second-period catch. Let the value of each sher i's exit option be given by the function (e i ). This makes the plausible assumption that the exit option depends on a sher's endowment level: \exit" could refer to investing or deploying one's capacity in another sector. In general, the value of each sher's exit option will not be the same, unless they have equal endowments. Note that this does not rule out the case where (1) is a constant. It does for the time being rule out the possibility that each sher has a dierent exit-option function: that is, we assume that if e i = e j , then the shers' exit options are the same.
When is full conservation an equilibrium in this new setting? For a given sher i, conditional on sher j's conservation (that is, j's rst-period catch is zero), it must be that i's share of the second-period catch is greater than the value of deviating (shing to full capacity in period 1 and exiting in period 2). That is, for i = 1 ; 2,
In general, any comparative-static assertions about whether full conservation will be a Nash equilibrium under dierent wealth distributions will depend on the nature of the (1) function.
3.1.
Concave exit options.
Thus we will impose the restriction that (e i ) is a concave function, and furthermore that (e i ) 0 (3) In addition, we restrict attention to cases where \distribution matters"; that is, cases where there exists some distribution such that full conservation is not an equilibrium outcome. This can be stated as follows: there exists some wealth level e ? , 0 < e ? E, at which e ? E GF = minfe ? ; F g + (e ? )
If assumption (4) is not satised, then either full conservation or exit is preferred by both shers at all levels of wealth, conditional on the conservation of the other. Moreover, for simplicity, we shall assume that (0) = 0 (5) Finally, we wish to restrict attention to the case where the shery is economically viable, in the sense that the maximum possible sh production in the second period is greater than shing to capacity in the rst period and exiting with all of the shery's capacity in the second period. That is, GF F + (E). This can be restated as:
In what follows, let the exit strategy be the following course of action by one of the shers: sh to capacity in period 1, and exit in period 2. Now we can state the following propositions. Corollary 2 says that when the exit option is a nondecreasing concave function, together with the restrictions implied by assumptions (4) and (5), then whenever full conservation is an equilibrium with a perfectly equal distribution of wealth, there always exists a less equal distribution of wealth such that full conservation is not an equilibrium. In this case, equality is more conducive to conservation. Note that under the unequal distribution of wealth, it is the poorer agent who nds it in his interest to play the exit strategy. A s w e will see in a later section, this result generalizes to the case where only one sher has an exit option.
[ Figure 3 here]
The principal issues raised in Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 can be depicted graphically. First not that the Nash-equilibrium condition (2) can be rewritten as (e i )
e i E GF 0 minfe i ; F g (7) In Figure 3 , sher i's wealth is given on the horizontal axis, and i's payo is given on the vertical axis. The right-hand side of (7) is drawn as ONM, and the left-hand side ( (1)) is given by the concave function OS. Note that the sign of the right-hand side of (7) determines whether full conservation is an equilibrium in the basic (no-exit-option) version of the game introduced in Section 2. From Proposition 2, then, we know that the right-hand side must be positive for all values of e i greater than E=G, which is labeled B in Figure 3 . The point labeled A corresponds to F, the initial sh stock. A is the point o f i n tersection between the lines U i = e i ( GF E 0 1) to the left (note that the slope is negative as a result of the commons dilemma assumption (1)) and U i = e i GF E 0 F to the right. The wealth level e ? is labeled C. At all wealth levels to the right o f C, sher i strictly prefers conservation, conditional on conservation by sher j; at all wealth levels to the left of C (but not including the origin), sher i prefers the exit strategy.
In Figure 3 and all subsequent gures, E is treated as a constant. That is, as e i is increased, E does not increase; it is assumed that e j is decreased by an equal amount. Alternatively, the horizontal axis of the gures can be interpreted as representing the share of total wealth held by sher i when E = 1 .
According to Corollary 2, if full conservation is an equilibrium outcome under perfect equality, then there is a mean-preserving spread of the wealth distribution under which full conservation is not an equilibrium. Suppose that the two shers are initially endowed with wealth D in Figure 3 . Then by redistributing wealth away from sher i until his wealth lies to the left of C, full conservation is no longer an equilibrium; at such a new distribution, OS lies above ONM for sher i, and he will prefer the exit strategy.
[ Figure 4 here] Figures 4 and 5 depict the same situation for dierent forms of the exit-option function. In both gures, the exit options are weakly concave.
In Figure 4 , the exit-option function takes the form (e i ) = be i for nonnegative b. I t could be that b is an interest rate that can be earned if a sher's capacity i s i n vested elsewhere. Functions for two v alues of b are shown. The line OQ represents a value of b so high that neither sher would ever conserve; this is ruled out by our assumption (4). The line OP represents a lower value of b and can be analyzed like 0; e i = 0 a; e i > 0 for some a > 0. It can be analyzed in the same way as Figures 3 and 4 . This type of exit optio corresponds to a xed lump-sum available to each sher in the second period, and is invariant to their levels of wealth.
Proposition 6 illustrates that the conclusion of Proposition 5 is not completely general; that is, in the vein of Olson, extreme inequality can enhance the prospects for conservation. Proposition 6. In the exit-option game when assumptions (3) through (6) hold, under perfect inequality ( e = ( E;0) or e = ( 0 ; E )), full conservation is an equilibrium.
Proposition 6 immediately suggests the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For any given distribution of wealth e such that e i > 0 for i = 1 ; 2, there always exists a mean-preserving spread of e such that full conservation is an equilibrium. Proposition 6 illustrates that the logic of Olson's inequality h ypothesis extends to the case of the concave exit option. Proposition 5 illustrates, however, that with concave exit options, Olson's hypothesis cannot be interpreted as a general comparative-static result. Finally, Proposition 7 below indicates that there are cases when the conditions underlying Proposition 5 do not hold: that is, there is no full-conservation equilibrium with perfect equality.
Proposition 7. Consider the game described in Proposition 5, where assumptions (3) through (6) hold. If average wealth is less than e ? , then under perfect equality, full conservation is not a Nash equilibrium.
Refer to Figures 3 through 5. Proposition 7 states that if average wealth lies to the left of C, then under perfect equality, both shers would prefer the exit strategy, and full conservation will not be an equilibrium outcome.
As we will see below, this result generalizes to the case where only one sher has an exit option. Note that the condition in Proposition 7 that average wealth is less than e ? does not contradict assumption (6) , which requires only that total wealth is greater than e ? . Proposition 7 suggests that whether or not average wealth is less than e ? is an important criterion for whether a given commons situation (with concave exit options) is subject to \Olson eects." Specically, i f a v erage wealth is less than e ? , then increased inequality i s necessary for equilibrium conservation.
3.2.
Convex and asymmetric exit options.
In the cases analyzed in Propositions 5 through 7 and illustrated in Figures 3 through 5 , the return to the exit strategy, relative to conservation (and always conditional on conservation by the other sher) is diminishing in wealth: when there is exit, it is the smaller sher who exits. In case studies of commons with exit options it is frequently (though by no means exclusively) asserted that, when exit occurs, it is the large resource user who exits. How is the prediction of Proposition 5 reconciled with this empirical evidence? First, it could be that exit options are not concave (or even weakly concave) functions of wealth. Second, it could be that exit option functions (and not just the exit-option values) are dierent for the dierent shers. Each of these possibilities is considered in turn.
[ Figure 6 here] Figure 6 illustrates a convex exit option function. The principal complication is that there are several \crossover" points corresponding to the wealth value e ? in the concave case. Thus, for example, begin at a position of perfect inequality with total wealth D in Figure 6 ; that is, one sher's endowment is D and the other's is 0. Full conservation is not an equilibrium outcome, because the sher with positive wealth will prefer the exit strategy. If wealth is more equally redistributed in the range of point C, full conservation is an equilibrium outcome. If one sher's wealth is C while the other's is in the range of A, however, full conservation is not an equilibrium outcome.
Situations like that depicted in Figure 6 might well describe many commons with exit options. In general, because of the kinked \convex" shape of the right-hand side of the Nash-equilibrium condition (7), a convex left-hand side of the same condition will cross the right-hand side more than once. With convex exit-option functions, we can make the following proposition, which does not, in general, hold when exit-options are concave. Proposition 8. In the exit-option game where each sher has an exit option given by (e i ), let (1) be a convex and increasing function of wealth, and let (0) = 0. If there exists any wealth distribution e 2 1(E) such that both shers have positive wealth and under which full conservation is an equilibrium outcome, then full conservation is not an equilibrium outcome under perfect equality.
In some commons situations, agents' exit options are qualitatively dierent. In a particular in-shore shery, for example, it is not simply that the poorer sher has less capacity, but instead a fundamentally dierent shing technology than the larger sher. The larger sher can move his ocean-going trawler to another harvesting ground, but if the poor sher tried to do the same in his small primitive boat, he would stand a good chance of dying at sea. More generally, the smaller agent's capacity is location-specic in a way that the larger agent's is not.
Suppose that only one sher has an exit option: this seems a not-too-extreme approximation of the asymmetric-technology argument made in the previous paragraph. Figure 3 can be reinterpreted to depict this case. Suppose that OS is sher 1's exit-option function, and that ONM is the conditional payo to conservation for both shers. Conditional on sher 1's conservation, sher 2 will always conserve if his wealth lies anywhere to the right of point B. Here the problem is not that sher 2 will exit, but rather that he will deviate from conservation by shing to capacity in period 1. Now if the shers were to begin at a position of perfect equality a t D, full conservation would be an equilibrium outcome. If sher 2's wealth were reduced to some amount between B and C (and sher 1's wealth correspondingly increased), full conservation would still be an equilibrium outcome, unlike the situation described by Proposition 5. Nevertheless, if sher 2's wealth were reduced to a point between O and B, he would choose to deviate, and full conservation would not be an equilibrium outcome. If sher 2's wealth were reduced to O, then as in Proposition 6, full conservation is an equilibrium outcome. Finally, i f a v erage wealth lies to the left of C, then as in Proposition 7, there is no full-conservation equilibrium under perfect equality.
In the asymmetric exit-option case, our previous interpretation of mean-preserving spreads changes in two w a ys: rst, whether or not a mean-preserving spread destroys a full-conservation equilibrium depends on the identity of the sher who gains under the redistribution; second, the minimum unequalizing redistribution needed to destroy a fullconservation equilibrium must be more unequalizing than the minimum necessary redistribution in Proposition 5.
Our earlier assumption that exit-option functions were at least weakly concave made strong comparative-static results possible. In the gures, the concavity assumption leads to a sort of \single-crossing" property: there exists a range of wealth levels at which a sher will not conserve, conditional on the other's conservation, and at all higher wealth levels, the sher will conditionally conserve. Nevertheless, if there is more than one crossing of the two curves in the diagrams | as in the case of the convex exit-option function | then the comparison of two or more wealth distributions is more complicated. If in the case where there are multiple crossings conservation is not initially an equilibrium outcome, it is not always possible to say whether it will be an equilibrium outcome under any more (or less) unequal distribution. If the right-hand side of the inequality (7) is also concave (which might occur under considerably more complicated assumptions about the shing production function | such as those considered in Section 4.1 below), then even with concave exit-option functions this can give rise to multiple crossings. 9 The nature of the exit-option functions is ultimately an empirical question. In many situations, exit-option functions are probably linear beyond some level of wealth | this represents a risk-free bond earning a xed interest rate. But at lower levels of wealth, the exit-option function is convex as a result of borrowing constraints. As we have seen, however, in all cases the presence of exit options generally complicates the prospects for conservation. 4 .
Extensions of the basic model 4.1. Generalizing the catch technology and cost functions.
The basic model introduced in Section 2 features a very simple linear production technology and zero cost of eort. In this section we consider a more conventional characterization of costs and production in the shery. First, there is a cost of supplying shing eort, and second, the catch per unit of eort is a declining function of aggregate eort, as it becomes more dicult to catch sh as the stock is depleted.
Consider a one-period variant of our basic model. Suppose that shers choose a level of eort a i , a s a b o v e, but that a sher's \wealth" is given by the size of his capital stock k i , which is xed each period. Each sher i seeks to maximize payo i taking as xed a j and k i . Then using the rstorder conditions from these maximization problems, the Nash equilibrium is the pair of eort levels ( We will show that under these conditions, an equalizing redistribution of capital ownership can increase aggregate catch. Proposition 9 shows that increasing inequality reduces aggregate catch. In the static context of this section there is no intertemporal conservation mechanism. By reducing catch, inequality reduces welfare.
4.2.
More than two agents.
Most of our results are not qualitatively changed if there are more than two shers. Proposition 10 extends both our Propositions 2 and 4. In what follows, we call any outcome in which some but not all shers fully conserve until the second period \partial conservation." Note that we do not mean that some shers partially conserve. Say that there is a set of shers I. Although it will not be necessary in the proof of the proposition, let us say that if some subset of shersÎ I shes to capacity in period 1, and they deplete the sh stock, then each of these \defecting" shers i receives Part (a) of Corollary 4 merely states that mean-preserving spreads of the wealth distribution do not necessarily destroy a cooperative equilibrium outcome: take some wealth from l (but make sure that e l is still greater than or equal to E=G) and give i t t o m. Part (b) goes further and states that mean-preserving spreads can enhance eciency in the spirit of Proposition 4 (in the two-sher case): take some wealth from p 2Î and transfer it to some q in I nÎ (who is by denition wealthier). Then there is no change in the composition ofÎ, but the amount of rst-period shing is reduced by exactly the amount of wealth taken from p.
Finally, if partial conservation is an equilibrium outcome, there exist wealth-equalizing transfers such that full depletion is the only equilibrium outcome under the new wealth distribution. Suppose thatÎ is such that P i2Î e i = F 0 for > 0 small. Then we take wealth E G 0 e r + from some sher r 2 I nÎ and transfer it to some (poorer) sher s 2Î. N o w r will sh to capacity in period 1, but so will all the other shers, since condition # 3 of Proposition 10 is no longer satised and partial conservation is not an equilibrium outcome.
Now it remains to generalize to the n-sher case Proposition 4, which states that once the wealth distribution is suciently unequal, further mean-preserving spreads of that distribution increase equilibrium eciency. The proof of Proposition 4 constructs this threshold wealth inequality. Proposition 11 below gives sucient conditions on the wealth distribution such that increases in inequality (weakly) increase equilibrium eciency in the n-sher extension of the basic game; part of the task of Proposition 11 is to characterize what is meant by \suciently unequal" in the many-sher case.
Let us restrict attention to a particular class of mean-preserving spreads of the wealth distribution. Consider bilateral wealth transfers from a sher j to a sher k such that e j < E = G and e k E=G. Fisher j would sh to capacity in period 1 before the transfer, and e j e k . Call this class of mean-preserving spreads unequalizing wealth transfers. Many more complicated mean-preserving spreads can be characterized as the outcome of a sequence of such unequalizing wealth transfers. Proposition 11 states that if there is at least one sher whose wealth is below the conservation threshold E=G, and at least one sher whose wealth is suciently large that he will conserve regardless of the actions of the other shers, then there always exist wealth redistributions that increase inequality and (at least weakly) equilibrium eciency.
Note that the conditions of Proposition 11 are not met if all shers conserve initially (i.e., J is empty). From Proposition 10, we know that this situation can only hold if all shers have wealth at least as great as E=G. Thus in that situation, the wealth distribution is not suciently unequal for the Olson-style mechanism of Propositions 4 and 11 to operate.
5.
Concluding remarks 5.1. Crafting distributive rules.
In real-world commons problems, economic actors often craft institutions to regulate community use of common-pool resources. If the problem is one of multiple equilibria (as is the case in our model when the conditions of Proposition 2 are satised), the task of such local regulation is merely to coordinate actors on one Paretoecient equilibrium. If the problem is a prisoners dilemma (as is the case under other parameter congurations for our model), there must be a structure of rules, very likely with monitoring and enforcement, that transforms the dilemma into a coordination game and the Pareto-superior outcome into a self-enforcing equilibrium. (This is essentially the message of Ostrom's (1990) synthesis of local regulation of the commons.) Fishers worldwide have elaborated schemes of social regulation with varying degrees of success; many of these cases are reviewed in Baland and Platteau (1998) . In this section, we discuss such regulatory regimes in light of our model. 10 Fishers in our model might consider three regulatory mechanisms to govern the exploitation of the sh stock: they could redistribute wealth (e 1 ; e 2 ) before period 1; they could redistribute catch ( 1 1 ; 1 2 ) after the rst period; or they could redistribute sh ( 2 1 ; 2 2 ) after the second period. (Many of the distributive rules described in the eld-study literature reallocate shing locations: these can be interpreted as redistributions of capacity. If shing locations have dierent productivities, the default share of the shing stock accruing to each sher will be dierent. Note that for our model to apply, it must also be that the shing locations are not physically isolated from one another.) Such schemes have t w o possible eects on the payo of the game. First, the scheme could impose a ne on the player who does not abide by the cooperative agreement: this reduces the return to cheating. Second, output could be shared in the cooperative outcome dierently from the default sharing rule of the noncooperative game (i.e., fe i =Eg i2I ). This change in the sharing rule could arise from redistribution of catch, or from pre-play wealth redistribution.
Propositions 1 through 4 and their corollaries are comparative-static results, but can be reinterpreted as statements regarding redistribution of capacity. Thus, for example, Proposition 2 tells us that for wealth distributions that give each sher positive wealth, full conservation is an equilibrium if and only if each sher's share of total wealth is greater than 1=G. I f G is at least two, then there always exists a preplay capacity redistribution such that full conservation is an equilibrium outcome. With the appropriate wealth transfer, full conservation can be supported as an equilibrium, even if it was impossible under the initial distribution. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the transfer under a self-enforcing equilibrium is limited; the sher who cedes wealth must be at least as well o under full conservation, post-transfer, as under full depletion, pre-transfer.
An alternative to pre-play wealth transfers is that shers eect transfers of sh conditional on the size of individual rst-period catch. Eectively, this means that they can tax each other. It is a well-known result in the sheries literature that if rst-period catch can be taxed at a rate of 100%, then a rst-best outcome can be implemented under just about any circumstances (including most exit-option scenarios). (This is essentially the same as boat licensing in our model: limiting the number of boats (i.e., the proportion of e i ) that each sher i uses in period 1 is directly related to limiting his catch.) Nevertheless, transaction costs might make it impossible to observe each sher's period-1 catch and thereby collect taxes. An interesting possibility is that the power to tax is asymmetric; it is plausible to assume that some factor (economic or otherwise) makes it possible for one sher to impose a sanction on the other, but that the latter is impeded from reciprocating. It can be shown that, under certain conditions, if the poorer sher is given the power to tax the richer, cooperation is not an equilibrium outcome. This result extends to the case of concave exit options. In the case of convex exit-option functions, however, the poorer sher is better able to enforce conservation.
An interesting consequence of democracy is that it grants to the poor the power to tax the rich. Bardhan (1993) discusses the democratization of environments in which traditional authority structures have previously enforced cooperative agreements. Until democracy is consolidated, cooperative performance of resource users can suer. (\Resource users" could refer to local villagers sharing a shery, or to citizens contributing to \social cohesion.") The discussion of asymmetric taxation under exit options shows that this depends on the nature of exit options open to the rich. If the exit-option functions of the rich are convex, then giving the poor the power to tax the rich might not prejudice cooperative behavior. If, however, exit-option functions are concave, cooperation can break down.
Finally, shers could redistribute the second-period catch once the game is over such that the share accruing to each sher is a function of his rst-period behavior. Assume that the aim of the mechanism is to reduce rst-period shing to zero. If both sh in the rst period, both receive their payos from the unregulated game (e 1 F=E;e 2 F=E). If both conserve in the rst period, then i receives a nonnegative share i of GF , where P i = 1 . I f one sher i cheats in the rst period, but the other does not, then i receives some share i of the second-period stock. Eectively, up to this point we have restricted i and ( i ) to equal e i =E. It can be shown that under such a rule complex, full conservation can emerge even if G < n . H o w e v er, the range of implementable mechanisms is, under certain circumstances, sensitive to the wealth distribution.
5.2.
Summary of results.
This paper presents a model of two shers dierentiated by asset-holding levels in an unregulated shery. Cooperation in this model takes the form of restraint in resource extraction: if both shers reduce their catch in the rst period, they can reap larger rewards after the sh stock has grown. Eciency is indexed by the amount of the initial sh stock available at the start of the second (and nal) period. The model explores the eect of inequality in asset ownership (shing capacity) on conservation of a commonpool resource. We demonstrate that Olson's (1965) inequality h ypothesis | interpreted as a comparative-static statement that increasing inequality enhances eciency | is not strictly correct. We give conditions such that inequality reduces equilibrium eciency (conservation of the sh stock). If shers have earnings opportunities outside the commons (\exit options") that are concave functions of wealth, increased inequality can reduce the prospects for full conservation. Furthermore, there exists a wealth distribution beyond which increasing wealth inequality increases equilibrium eciency (though not attaining full conservation as long as both shers have positive wealth), and full conservation is an equilibrium under perfect inequality. The relationship between inequality and conservation can be U-shaped: at very low and very high levels of inequality, conservation is possible, while for a middle range of inequality, it is not. 
Given that ei > F (G 0 1)=G, then (13) is strictly less than
which is (14) . Thus sher 2's payo to depletion is larger than his payo to conservation, conditional on sher 1's having chosen depletion. The argument is the same for sher 1. Therefore fe1; e 2g is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that a1 = a2 = 0 is an equilibrium. If sher 1, say, deviates and plays a > 0 in period 1, he will receive a total payo of a +e1G(F 0k)=E. Since a1 = a2 = 0 is a Nash equilibrium, this must be no better than the payo he would receive under the equilibrium, namely e1GF =E. That is,
Now suppose that ei E=G for i = 1 ; 2. Suppose that 2 plays 0 and that 0 is not a best reply for 1. Then there is some a > 0 such that a is a best reply for 1. If so, then e1 GF E < a + e1 G(F 0 a) E which implies e1 < E = G , a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3: The sher with zero wealth is indierent between conservation and depletion, given that both yield a payo of 0. Conditional on conservation by his opponent, the zero-wealth sher weakly prefers conservation. The sher with all the wealth prefers to harvest the sh stock in period 2 (when it is equal to GF ) rather than in period 1 (when it is equal to F ), as long as G 1, regardless of his counterpart's action. Thus full conservation is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let us restrict attention, without loss of generality, to the case where sher 1 is the larger sher. Say that sher 2's endowment is , and assume furthermore that < F . If 2 plays his full capacity in period 1, then 1's payo from full conservation is E 0 E G(F 0 ) (15) and his payo from playing his full capacity in period 1 is
The amount (15) is larger than (16) 
Given that E > F , this distribution in fact endows sher 1 more handsomely, a s w e h a ve assumed.) We have shown so far that full period-1 conservation is always a best reply for sher 1 to full-capacity shing by sher 2 in period 1. Note that with the distribution given bŷ e, E 0 > E = G , so that by Proposition 2, full conservation is also a best reply by sher 1 to full conservation by sher 2. Then for any redistribution of wealth away from sher 2, sher 1 will always play 0 in the rst period, and thus, regardless of sher 2's strategy, the amount of sh conserved until the second period will be larger.
Proof of Proposition 5: Assumptions (3), (4) and (5) . Then for the rst sher, condition (2) no longer holds, and conservation is no longer an equilibrium outcome. (ii) Full conservation is not an equilibrium under e. Then it must be that at least one sher's wealth lies below e ? . Then for any transfer from that sher to the other, so long as the rst still has positive wealth, the wealth distribution will be more unequal, and conservation will not be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6: Given that the shery is economically viable (6) , the sher with all the wealth prefers conservation to the exit strategy. The sher with zero wealth is, by assumption (5), indierent between conservation and the exit strategy. Therefore full conservation is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof of Proposition 7: I f a v erage wealth is less than e ? , then under perfect equality the distribution is given by ( E=2; E = 2) and e ? > E = 2. then for neither sher does condition (2) hold; that is, conditional on the other sher's conservation, each sher would prefer the exit strategy. Thus full conservation is not an equilibrium outcome.
Proof of Proposition 8: W e will prove the contrapositive of the proposition: that is, we will show that if under perfect inequality, full conservation is not an equilibrium outcome, then there exists no other wealth distribution with ei > 0; 8i under which full conservation is an equilibrium. Suppose that wealth is equally distributed, so that e = ( s; s), and that full conservation is not an equilibrium. There are three possible cases. (i) (ei) + minfei; F g > (ei=E)GF for all possible values of ei, i = 1 ; 2. In this case, both shers always prefer the exit strategy at all positive v alues of wealth, so there is no full-conservation equilibrium. Now if the condition (ei) + minfei; F g > (ei=E)GF is not met, then given the convexity o f (1), there is some range of wealth levels over which ei E GF (ei) + minfei; F g (17) Say that e is the lowest value of wealth for which (17) is true, and e is the highest level of wealth for which (17) is true. Then if under the distribution e = ( s; s), full conservation is not an equilibrium outcome, it must be either that s < e or s > e. These are the two remaining cases we must consider. (ii) s < e : All other wealth distributions are mean-preserving spreads of e. If wealth is taken from sher 1, say, and given to sher 2, the latter's wealth could eventually exceed e, so that 2 would be willing to conserve, conditional on 1's conservation. But 1's wealth will always be less than e, and given the restriction that both players' wealth always be positive, 1 will for all wealth less than s prefer the exit strategy. So full conservation is not an equilibrium for any wealth distribution other than e. (iii) s > e: Then, once again, all other distributions are mean-preserving spreads of e. If wealth is given to player 2, the exit strategy will continue to dominate conservation for 2, regardless of 1's strategy. Thus under no mean-preserving spreads of e is conservation an equilibrium outcome.
Proof of Proposition 9: Let the capital distribution be k1 = k2 = k, and consider a mean-preserving spread such that the new distribution of capital is (k+; k 0). Then the test is to determine the conditions under which 
The expression in parentheses in (19) is positive. It is the marginal product of (aggregate) eort in equilibrium. The marginal product of aggregate eort is equal to the sum of each sher's marginal product of individual eort, or the sum of the left-hand sides of the two expressions in (11) ; this in turn is equal to Proof of Proposition 10 (sketch): The proof is very simple and will not be given in full. If condition # 3 of the proposition is satised, then the depleting coalition leaves some sh to regenerate between periods; if # 3 is not satised, then the only equilibrium outcome is full depletion in period 1. Say that the shers inÎ I sh to capacity in period 1, and condition # 3 is satised. Then a sher j not inÎ gets payo (24) Now (23) is at least as large as (24) if and only if ej E=G. By similar logic, if a sher k nominally inÎ is unilaterally deciding between conserving or depleting, the condition for staying inÎ is that ek < E = G .
Proof of Proposition 11: In each case that follows, consider a transfer from sher j to sher k. I f k 2 I , then k will always conserve regardless of the choices made by other shers. To see this, consider k's choice.
Say that all other shers sh to capacity in period 1, and that E0k P i6 =k ei is the sum of wealth held by all other shers. Furthermore, assume that E0k < F . Then if k chooses to conserve, his payo is ek E G(F 0 E0k) (25) while if k shes to capacity in period 1, his payo is (ek=E)F . Now (25) 
But (27) always holds by k's inclusion in I. Thus for any sher with wealth suciently great to be in I conservation is a dominant strategy. Now consider an unequalizing wealth transfer to such a sher k. The result of such a transfer is that the sher j who loses wealth must reduce rst-period shing one-for-one with his wealth reduction; k waits to deploy his wealth, including the transfer from j, u n til the second period. Thus period-1 shing is strictly decreased and equilibrium eciency is strictly increased.
We must also consider unequalizing transfers j 2 J to shers k not in I . I f k 2 J , then ek < E = G . After the transfer > 0, j's period-1 shing is decreased by . I f ek + E=G, then k could choose to conserve and equilibrium eciency would strictly increase. If ek + < E = G , k will increase his period-1 shing by and aggregate period-1 shing (and thus equilibrium eciency) is unchanged. Suppose nally that k is neither in J nor I . As before j will decrease his period-1 shing by after the transfer. If k conserves in equilibrium before the transfer, k will continue to do so after the transfer; aggregate period-1 shing is decreased by . E v en if k did not conserve before the transfer, he could now nd it optimal to do so, and equilibrium eciency would increase. If k did not conserve before the transfer, and still chooses not to after the transfer, his increased shing exactly osets j's reduction and equilibrium eciency is unchanged.
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